9 Jan
2025
9 Jan
'25
9:55 a.m.
Dear All,
The "Wittgen=steine" group organizes a talk next week, Friday, January
17th, 2025, 3:00pm to 4:30pm, HS 2i:
Oskari Kuusela (University of East Anglia): "Grammar and truth"
Abstract: Wittgenstein's rejection of philosophical theses in both his
early and later work has posed a problem for the reception of his
philosophy. Having been largely ignored in connection with the
_Tractatus_ until Diamond's seminal papers in the late 1980's, and
thereafter variously treated and mistreated, the story is similar in the
case of Wittgenstein's later work. Arguably, the logical role of
grammatical statements, as construed, for example, by Peter Hacker and
his followers is essentially that of philosophical theses, except that
Hackerian so-called grammatical truths claim acceptability by all users
of relevant expressions. To describe such Hackerian theses as undeniable
super-theses would not be an exaggeration in contrast to Wittgenstein's
own claim to pull back any statements not agreed upon by his
interlocutors. Another interpretational tendency has been to treat
grammatical statements as merely pragmatically useful, rather than
truth-apt (in the style of Carnap). In my talk I address this set of
issues, arguing that whilst grammatical statements are indeed truth-apt,
they are not representations of truths unlike theses. Instead
grammatical statements, whose logical role is that of a model employed
as an object of comparison, constitute instruments for comprehending
what is true, whereby truth may be more complex than what a grammatical
statement or model represents it as being. To my knowledge this is a
novel position in the history of philosophy dominated by theses regarded
as exclusively true representations of truth. (If I have time, I
conclude by comparing Wittgenstein with Heidegger on truth.)
Everybody welcome!
Best wishes from the organizers,
Esther Heinrich
Anja Weiberg
Martin Kusch