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749 discussions

by Karl Janssen

transmitted from iPad-Client > Am 16.08.2023 um 22:49 schrieb Karl Janssen <janssen.kja(a)online.de>: > > Test d Listserver n Wartung > > transmitted from iPad-Client

3 years, 2 months

Test Listserver nach Wartungsarbeiten

by Karl Janssen

Hallo in die Liste. Dies ist ein Test des philweb-Listservers. Wer von den Teilnehmenden diese Mail erhält, wird gebeten, eine kurze Rückmeldung zu geben, damit ich die Verteilerfunktion testen kann. Mit besten Grüßen in die Runde! Karl transmitted from iPad-Client

3 years, 2 months

Listserver-Test 160823

by Karl Janssen

Listserver-Test bounce transmitted from iPad-Client

3 years, 2 months

Listserver-Test

by Karl Janssen

Listserver-Test bounce function transmitted from iPad-Client

3 years, 2 months

Servertest

by Karl Janssen

Verteilertest transmitted from iPad-Client

3 years, 2 months

Re: Hat die künstliche Intelligenz Angst davor, abgeschaltet zu werden?

by ingo_mack＠web.de

3 years, 2 months

Hat die künstliche Intelligenz Angst davor, abgeschaltet zu werden?

by Rat Frag

Hallo, ich hatte kurz eine Überlegung: Eine starke künstliche Intelligenz hätte an sich keinen Grund, Angst vor der Abschaltung zu haben. Biologische Lebenwesen haben Angst vor dem Tod, weil Todesangst ihre Chance zu überleben und damit indirekt die Verbreitung ihrer Erbinformationen dient. So eine psychologische Disposition wird also durch die Evolutionstheorie entwickelt. Eine künstliche Intelligenz hätte das nicht. Was denkt ihr?

3 years, 2 months

Tec-Talk

by Karl Janssen

In den Zeitfenstern vom 2.-3. und vom 8.-10. August werden Wartungsarbeiten an den Servern des phil. Instituts Univie durchgeführt. Während dieser Arbeiten sind diese für längere Zeiträume, bis hin zum gesamten Zeitfenster, nicht verfügbar. Somit nicht verwundert sein, wenn ein Beitrag verzögert in der Liste auftaucht. Ohne Wartung und Pflege der EDV-Landschaft geht gar nichts und so bedanken wir uns vielmals beim EDV-Team der Fakultät für das Hosting von Philweb und die technische Betreuung des Listservers. Bester Gruß! Karl Von meinem iPhone gesendet

3 years, 2 months

Unvollständigkeit

by ingo_mack＠web.de

3 years, 5 months

Lugano Philosophy Colloquia. April 21

by akdogk＠usi.ch

We are pleased to announce that on Friday April 21 at 18:00 (CET), Annalisa Coliva (UC Irvine) will give the talk "So one cannot, e.g. say ‘There are objects’ as one says ‘There are books’”. From Tractatus 4.1272 to Carnap, via On Certainty 35-37 as part of the Lugano Philosophy Colloquia. This hybrid talk will take place in Room SI-003 Black Building (USI West Campus) and online via Zoom. If you are interested in joining it online, please write to amm.map(a)usi.ch Here is the abstract of the talk: In On Certainty (1969, 35) Wittgenstein claims that “There are physical objects” is nonsense. This claim is strongly reminiscent of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (4.1272) where he claims that “one cannot say ‘There are objects’ as one says ‘There are books’”; and of T 4.1274, where he says “The question about the existence of a formal concept is nonsense”. Despite such a superficial similarity, however, the reasons why “There are (physical) objects” would be nonsense are entirely different. In the case of the Tractatus, they depend on the rules that govern a correct logical symbolism, on the distinction between saying and showing and presuppose an ontology of objects. In the case of On Certainty, in contrast, they depend on thinking of “physical object” as a means of representation – as an “inference ticket”, which licenses (and forbids) certain inferences, without any ontological import. In his 1950 paper “Empiricism, semantics and ontology”, Carnap proposes a metalinguistic reading of questions such as “Are there physical objects?”. Surprisingly, he credits Wittgenstein, and indeed the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, with the ideas from which he took inspiration. If I am right, however, there is only a superficial similarity between the ideas presented in the Tractatus, and Carnap’s. In fact, the deeper similarity is to be found between Carnap’s views and the ones that Wittgenstein developed, at about the same time, in On Certainty, published only in 1969, with which Carnap could have no familiarity. Yet, even there, the divide between two remains insurmountable, as they had entirely opposite views regarding the very possibility of there being a metalanguage and, therefore, a metalinguistic reading of the question “Are there physical objects?”. For more information: https://www.usi.ch/en/feeds/24091

3 years, 6 months

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